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Before International Tax Reform, 
We Need to Understand Why  
Firms Invert
Michael S. Knoll, JD, PhD
Corporate inversions—cross-border acquisitions in which a U.S. corporation 
acquires a foreign target in such a manner that the foreign corporation emerges as 
the parent of the group, with the U.S. corporation as a wholly owned subsidiary—
have generated substantial debate in academic, business and policy circles.
Many critics of corporate inversions have described 
inverting companies as “unpatriotic”1 for shirking 
their obligations to pay their fair share of taxes; they 
have applauded federal action to stem corporate 
inversions and have called for further restrictions.2  
By some estimates, there is as much as $2.4 trillion  
in untaxed profits ($1 trillion of which is in cash)  
held abroad by U.S. corporations that could escape 
taxation if inversions were freely permitted.3 Some 
critics also argue that inversions have to be stopped 
because inverted companies are likely to move their 
headquarters offshore and shift their employment, 
investment, and research and development away from 
the United States.4 
In contrast with these critics, managers of invert-
ing corporations protest that they are not the villains 
they have been made out to be, but rather are the 
victims of an unfair and antiquated U.S. tax system 
that dates from a time when business was much more 
national than international.5 These managers blame 
the U.S. tax laws—which, they say, hamper their 
ability to compete with foreign rivals6—and call for 
fundamental tax reform, including the elimination of 
U.S. taxation of active foreign income.7 At the center 
of their complaint, U.S. multinational corporations 
SUMMARY
• A wave of corporate inversions by U.S. firms over the past 
two decades has generated substantial debate in academic, 
business, and policy circles.
• The core of the debate hinges on a couple of key economic 
questions: Do U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.-domiciled com-
panies relative to their foreign competitors? And, if so, do 
inversions improve the competitiveness of U.S. multinational 
firms both abroad and at home? 
• There is unfortunately little, if any, empirical work directly 
determining whether U.S.-based MNCs are currently tax-
disadvantaged compared to their foreign rivals, or measuring 
the amount by which (if any) U.S.-based MNCs improve their 
competitive position by inverting. 
• This brief, however, summarizes both old and new research 
that views these questions through the lens of corporations’ 
global effective tax rates (ETRs), and finds that the stronger 
case seems to be that U.S.-domiciled corporations are often 
tax-disadvantaged and that they can improve their competitive 
position by inverting.
• Additional evidence also suggests that U.S. MNCs can increase 
their after-tax cash flow by inverting.
• Inversions indicate that something is fundamentally wrong with 
the tax system. The brief concludes by discussing two feasible 
paths forward for reform.
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(MNCs) claim that they are taxed 
more heavily than their foreign rivals 
on the same income.8 By inverting, 
U.S.-domiciled companies avoid the 
U.S. tax system’s disadvantageous 
treatment of resident businesses and 
place themselves on the same footing 
as their overseas competitors. 
Proponents of this view argue 
that, as long as the U.S. tax system 
continues to favor foreign owner-
ship over domestic ownership of 
corporate assets, if U.S. companies 
are prevented from inverting through 
transactions that allow the U.S. parent 
to retain control, they would instead 
become takeover targets for foreign 
corporations. Such takeovers, they 
claim, would likely produce larger 
shifts in headquarters, employment, 
investment, and R&D away from the 
United States than would inversions.9 
In considering these compet-
ing views, the central factual issue 
is whether the U.S. tax laws disad-
vantage U.S.-domiciled companies 
relative to their foreign competitors 
domiciled in countries with territo-
rial tax systems. In a 2014 article, 
one prominent industry practitioner 
and researcher asserted “international 
business ‘competitiveness’ has noth-
ing to do with the reasons for these 
deals.”10 His article has been cited 
for contending that U.S.-domiciled 
companies are not tax-disadvantaged 
relative to their foreign competitors 
and that U.S.-domiciled companies 
do not improve their competitive 
position by inverting.11 That article, 
among others, has led many tax 
experts to advocate for the United 
States to move its international tax 
system further away from those of its 
major trading partners by adopting  
“a true worldwide tax system—with-
out deferral.”12 (The U.S. currently 
has a worldwide tax system with 
deferral, which has been derogatively 
described as an “ersatz territorial tax 
system.”13) 
Ultimately, the claim that U.S. 
MNCs are on a tax par with their 
foreign rivals is an empirical one. 
Unfortunately, there is little, if any, 
empirical work directly determin-
ing whether U.S.-based MNCs 
currently are tax-advantaged, tax-
disadvantaged, or roughly on par with 
their foreign rivals, or measuring the 
amount by which (if any) U.S.-based 
MNCs improve their competitive 
position by inverting.14 That said, 
the stronger case seems to be that 
U.S.-domiciled corporations are often 
tax-disadvantaged relative to their 
non-U.S. rivals and that they can 
improve their competitive position by 
inverting. 
This is a policy problem because 
inversions are an indicator that 
some part of the tax system is poorly 
designed and potentially malfunction-
ing. This brief will explore the primary 
tax considerations that companies 
evaluate when making the decision to 
invert; highlight some key data from 
past inversions that shed light on 
management expectations of inver-
sions; and discuss two policy avenues 
for addressing, in whole or in part, the 
ongoing use of corporate inversions.
PRIMARY MOTIVATIONS FOR 
INVERTING 
There are two potential competitive-
ness arguments, or accounts, that  
can be made about inversions. U.S.-
based MNCs might invert to improve 
their ability to compete with their 
foreign rivals for opportunities outside 
the United States (the outbound 
account) or inside the United States 
(the inbound account). Importantly, 
these two accounts are largely inde-
pendent of one another. There is also  
a third account for inversions, 
although not strictly about competi-
tiveness, that is closely related to the 
outbound account.
 1  E.g., Max Baucus, “Corporate Tax Shelters: Looking Under 
the Roof,” Senate Finance Committee Hearing, 107th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1.
 2  E.g., in reference to inversions, Rep. Peter Welch, D-Vt., 
quoted in Renae Merle’s article, “Obama Criticizes Com-
panies That Leave U.S. for Lower Taxes,” WashingtonPost.
com, Apr. 5, 2016 (“We’re just hemorrhaging the resources 
that we need from companies to pay their fair share.”). 
 3  Citizens for Tax Justice, “Fortune 500 Companies Hold a 
Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore” (Mar 3, 2016) ($2.4 trillion 
unrepatriated profits of U.S. MNCs); Eric Platt, “Top 50 
Boardroom Hoarders Sit on $1 Trillion in Cash,” Financial 
Times, May 11, 2015 (citing a company analysis that U.S. 
companies hold about $1.1 trillion in cash overseas). 
Those earnings are often said to be “locked out” of the 
United States. 
 4  E.g., Jeff Malehorn, “Why Corporate Headquarters Matter 
to Chicago,” World Business Chicago, Feb. 16, 2016. 
 5  E.g., Walter Galvin, “Why Corporate Inversions Are All the 
Rage,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014.
 6  E.g., Bret Wells, “What Corporate Inversions Teach About 
International Tax Reform,” Tax Notes, June 21, 2010, p. 
1345 (arguing that the corporate inversions provide “clear 
and noncontroversial evidence” that non-U.S. MNCs have a 
tax advantage over U.S.-domiciled MNCs in both U.S. and 
foreign markets). 
 7  Galvin, supra note 5. 
 8  Joshua Simpson, “Analyzing Corporate Inversions and 
Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule,” 68 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 673, 703 (2013). See also Wells, supra note 11. 
 9  Testimony of Michelle Hanlon, the Howard W. Johnson 
Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, before 
the House Ways and Means Committee, at 3-4 (Feb. 24, 
NOTES
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IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS 
ABROAD 
The “outbound account” describes 
how inversions operate as a self-
help mechanism U.S. corporations 
use to achieve territorial taxation 
and hence eliminate the competitive 
disadvantage they have with foreign 
rivals.15 Under U.S. law, the active 
non-U.S. income earned directly by a 
U.S. corporation (or by a branch, an 
unincorporated entity owned by a U.S. 
corporation) is taxed by the United 
States as it is earned, whereas the 
active foreign income earned by a for-
eign subsidiary of a U.S. parent cor-
poration is taxed by the United States 
only when that income is repatriated 
to the United States.16 Thus, the U.S. 
tax system encourages U.S. companies 
with foreign-source income that has 
not been taxed at a rate as high as the 
U.S. statutory tax rate to earn income 
through a foreign corporation and 
then defer repatriation. 
In contrast with the United States 
and its worldwide tax system, most 
countries use territorial tax systems 
that exempt the active foreign income 
of domestic corporations. The argu-
ment that inversions by U.S. firms are 
a rational response to the disadvan-
tage of worldwide taxation begins by 
recognizing that U.S. tax law considers 
a corporation to be domiciled where 
it is incorporated (regardless of the 
extent of its activities in that loca-
tion).17 Thus, a firm incorporated in 
the United States is a U.S. corpora-
tion and is subject to worldwide 
taxation on its income; in contrast, a 
firm incorporated outside the United 
States is a non-U.S. corporation and 
is subject to U.S. taxation only on its 
income from U.S. sources. Moreover, 
if a non-U.S. corporation is domi-
ciled in a country that has a territorial 
tax system, it generally will not pay 
home-country tax on active income 
earned outside its home jurisdiction. 
Following an inversion, the parent 
of the group is a non-U.S. corpora-
tion, while the U.S. corporation that 
inverted is still a U.S. corporation. At 
this point, corporate groups often use 
a variety of tax planning techniques 
to shift income that would other-
wise be taxed by the United States to 
the non-U.S. parent (or to non-U.S. 
corporations that are not subsidiar-
ies of a U.S. corporation) in order to 
avoid ever subjecting that income to 
tax by the United States. These tactics 
include shifting income from subsid-
iaries of a U.S. corporation to corpora-
tions that are not subsidiaries of a U.S. 
corporation,18 allowing the businesses 
operated by subsidiaries of a U.S. cor-
poration to wither while growing the 
businesses operated by subsidiaries of 
the foreign parent,19 and extensively 
using borrowing and other “hopscotch 
techniques” that shift cash and income 
from foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. 
corporation to the foreign parent 
without passing through the U.S. cor-
poration.20 To the extent that those 
tactics are effective, the foreign-source 
income of the U.S. corporation is, 
after the inversion, no longer subject 
to U.S. tax. That, in turn, reduces the 
tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
experienced by U.S. corporations in 
foreign markets. 
IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS  
AT HOME 
A second argument, the “inbound 
account,” has been getting more 
attention recently. It holds that 
inversions improve the ability of U.S. 
companies to compete with non-
U.S.-based MNCs for investments in 
the United States. 
Large, successful U.S. corpora-
tions are taxed at what is an effec-
tively flat rate of 35 percent. Income, 
however, is a net concept, and as has 
long been recognized, interest and 
royalty payments are very effective in 
shifting the source of income for tax 
purposes but otherwise have no eco-
2016). See also statement of Peter R. Merrill, principal, 
PwC, hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 113th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 (July 22, 2014). 
 10  Edward D. Kleinbard, “‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do 
With It,” Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p. 1055. 
 11  E.g., Avi-Yonah and Omri Y. Marian, “Inversions and Com-
petitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-Allergan,” 
41 Int’l Tax J. 39, 40 (Nov.-Dec. 2015). See also Marian, 
“Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions,” 90 Wash. 
L. Rev. 1, 10 n.44 (2015).
 12  Americans for Tax Fairness, “24 International Tax Experts 
Address Current Tax Reform Efforts in Congress,” at 3 
(Sept. 25, 2015). 
 13  Kleinbard, supra note 10, p. 1056.
 14  See testimony of Leslie Robinson, associate professor, Tuck 
School of Business at Dartmouth University, before the 
Finance Committee, “The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, 
or Reform It!” (July 22, 2014). 
 15  It should be noted that the comparatively high U.S. statu-
tory corporate tax rate of 35 percent—the highest among 
OECD countries—does not enter directly into the argument 
that the U.S. tax system disadvantages U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs relative to their foreign rivals. The relatively high 
U.S. corporate tax rate exacerbates that disadvantage but 
does not cause it. The disadvantage comes from the U.S. 
worldwide tax system, which subjects foreign income to 
U.S. taxation.
 16  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 954(c). 
 17  A notable exception to this general rule is IRC section 
7874, which treats a foreign corporation as a U.S. corpora-
tion if the owners of the U.S. corporation own more than 
80 percent of the combined entity after a merger of a U.S. 
corporation and a foreign corporation. 
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nomic significance when transfers are 
made within the same group of com-
panies (as long as the ultimate owner-
ship is the same). Because of this, there 
is opportunity in practice for foreign 
parents to capitalize U.S. subsidiar-
ies with debt (instead of equity), thus 
lowering U.S. income taxes (by the 
amount of the interest payments) and 
increasing (interest) income abroad, 
where it is taxed at a lower rate.
There is an important difference 
when foreign-based MNCs engage in 
income shifting and when U.S.-based 
MNCs do so. A non-U.S. corpora-
tion that strips income out from the 
United States permanently escapes 
U.S. tax on that income. In contrast, 
a U.S. corporation that strips income 
out from the United States only 
defers (possibly indefinitely) that 
income from U.S. worldwide taxation. 
Accordingly, non-U.S.-based MNCs 
can have a tax-induced competitive 
advantage over U.S. companies in 
the competition to own assets, make 
investments, and take advantage of 
opportunities in the United States. 
A FINAL (BUT SIMILAR) MOTIVATION
A third reason for why companies 
choose to invert—one that is not based 
on future competitiveness—is that 
U.S. MNCs are seeking to gain access 
to their large offshore stores of cash 
(i.e., prior overseas earnings), presum-
ably to repurchase shares and raise 
their stock price. This is not a wholly 
independent reason, as it is very similar 
to the outbound account, which claims 
that companies invert in order to 
reduce the tax burden on their future 
overseas earnings. Both explanations 
are clearly predicated on the value of 
reaching earnings held offshore, which 
are worth more to the company, its 
managers, and investors when they can 
be freely accessed without additional 
tax cost. The difference between these 
two explanations is merely timing. The 
competitiveness argument simply takes 
a step back in time and recognizes that 
before profits are earned, they will be 
worth more if they can be accessed 
immediately or whenever desired 
without having to incur a repatria-
tion tax.21 The difference is notable, 
however. Not all inverting companies 
already hold large offshore stocks of 
cash, and some high-profile proposed 
inversions, such as Walgreen’s aborted 
inversion, involve companies with little 
offshore cash.22 
KEY (TAX RATE) DATA
Any claim that U.S.-based MNCs 
are not at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to their foreign rivals rests on 
the premise that when properly viewed 
through the lens through which busi-
nesses make investment or capital bud-
geting decisions, U.S.-based MNCs are 
taxed no more heavily than their for-
eign rivals. Indeed, this is an argument 
that the incremental tax is not merely 
small, but that it is non-positive. 
This is a difficult claim to prove 
empirically, not least of all because 
there is substantial diversity in the 
way businesses incorporate taxes 
into their decision-making.23 Thus, 
some companies might use a financial 
accounting approach, whereas oth-
ers use a cash flow approach, and still 
others likely use both approaches.24 
Such a wide divergence in practice 
makes it difficult to describe precisely 
how taxes affect the capital budgeting 
decisions of U.S.-domiciled corpora-
tions, which in turn makes it more 
difficult to draw strong conclusions 
about how taxes affect the capital 
budgeting decisions of U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs relative to those of foreign-
domiciled MNCs. 
With this caveat in mind, my 
research examines both the financial 
accounting approach (using ETRs, 
or effective tax rates) and cash flow 
approach (using MTRs, or marginal 
tax rates). In each case, I assume that 
 18  Transfer pricing restrictions are imperfect. 
 19  Kleinbard, supra note 10, p. 1067.
 20  Id., p. 1065-1066. To some extent, these techniques have 
been curtailed over the last several years. 
 21 The same relationship holds for the inbound argument. 
Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs strip income out of the 
United States and into low-tax jurisdictions and that U.S. 
MNCs invert to access prior earnings without additional 
tax. According to the inbound competitiveness argument, 
U.S. MNCs invert to access their future U.S. earnings more 
easily and cheaply. 
 22  Felipe Cortes et al., “The Effect of Inversions on Corporate 
Governance” (Oct. 25, 2016). 
 23  Graham et al., “Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Mak-
ing,” working paper (Jan. 2017) (roughly 750 companies 
provided usable responses). 
 24  Graham et al. asked tax executives what tax rate their busi-
ness “primarily” used, making it unlikely that companies 
using more than one tax rate would indicate that they use 
multiple tax rates. 
 25  The ETR is the average rate at which a company’s pre-tax 
profits are taxed. It is calculated by dividing the taxes a 
company paid by its total taxable income. The MTR is 
the present value of the incremental taxes to be paid if a 
project is undertaken, divided by the present value of the 
project’s net cash flow. That tax rate reflects both when that 
cash flow is taxed and the rate at which it is taxed. 
 26  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, “The Effective Tax 
Rates of the Largest U.S. and EU Multinationals,” 6 Tax L. 
Rev. 375 (2012); PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates” (April 
14, 2011); and Kevin Markle & Douglas S. Shackelford, 
“Cross-Country Comparisons of Corporate Income Taxes,” 
65 Nat’l Tax J. 493.
NOTES 
5TABLE 1:  MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS ABOUT POST-INVERSION ETRS
 
Company Year of Inversion Pre-Inversion ETR Expected ETR 
Steris Corp. 2015 32% 25%
Applied Materials 2015 (Canceled) 22% 17%
Johnson Controls 2016 29% 18-19%
Waste Connections Inc. 2016 40% 27%
Baxalta 2016 23-24% 16-17%
Pfizer 2016 (Canceled) 25% 17-18%
CF Industries Holdings Inc. 2016 (Canceled) 35% 20% 
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domestic and foreign MNCs incorpo-
rate taxes into their decision-making 
in the same manner (potentially dif-
fering only in the rates they use).25
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
I first examine the financial account-
ing approach, as the ETR is the 
tax rate most often referenced dur-
ing public debate over inversions. 
Although several studies find that 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs have no higher 
global ETRs than MNCs domiciled 
in the rest of the world,26 when one 
digs more deeply into those studies, 
one finds that on average U.S.-domi-
ciled MNCs have higher global ETRs 
than do MNCs domiciled in most 
other market-oriented countries.27 
In particular, many U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs in the pharmaceuticals indus-
try, an industry that has experienced 
many highly publicized inversions, 
have higher global ETRs than their 
foreign-domiciled rivals.28 
There are also studies of specific 
inverting firms and the impact of 
inverting on their ETRs. Before 2004, 
U.S. MNCs could invert through so-
called “naked inversions,” whereby the 
U.S. company could change residence 
by merging into a shell corporation 
registered in another jurisdiction. 
Studies using pre-2004 data consis-
tently and uniformly show substantial 
declines in global ETRs following 
inversions, with the savings likely 
arising from both U.S. and foreign 
markets.29 After 2004, the target 
corporation could no longer be a shell; 
instead, the inversion had to involve 
a substantial target corporation with 
significant assets and business activ-
ity. Those rules, which have been 
expanded and tightened since 2004, 
have made it more difficult for U.S. 
MNCs to find an appropriate target 
for inversion. Also, since 2005, when 
the repatriation holiday ended, suc-
cessful U.S. MNCs have been piling 
up cash overseas in apparent anticipa-
tion of a new holiday and they have 
become more effective in shifting 
income overseas. Thus, one might be 
reluctant to draw conclusions about 
the current situation from studies 
based on pre-2004 inversions. 
Unfortunately, there are only a few 
recent studies of the effect of inverting 
on corporations’ global ETRs, and the 
studies that are available are neither 
uniform in their conclusions nor 
entirely convincing on the impact of 
inverting on a company’s global ETR. 
Even so, most recent studies suggest 
(and are generally consistent with) 
the notion that many U.S.-domiciled 
companies lower their global ETRs by 
inverting.30 
Another approach to the question 
of the expected effect of inverting on 
an MNC’s global ETR is to see what 
the management of an inverting com-
pany publicly say they expect to hap-
 27 PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates,” supra note (U.S-domi-
ciled. MNCs had higher global ETRs than MNCs from all the 
other countries studied except for Japan and Germany); 
and Markle & Shackelford, supra note. (U.S-domiciled. 
MNCs had higher global ETRs than MNCs from all the other 
countries studied except for Japan)  See also Martin A. Sul-
livan “Untangling Corporate Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes 
1299, Mar. 16, 2015 (summarizing Avi-Yonah & Lahav, 
PwC and Markle-Shackelford studies).
 28  PwC, “Pharma 2020:  Taxing Times Ahead” 7, figure 5 
(2009).
 29  Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, “Expectations and 
Expatriations:  Tracing the Causes and Consequences of 
Corporate Inversions, 55 Nat’l Tax J. 4009 (2002) (con-
cluding that there were both outbound and inbound tax 
savings from inversions); Jim A Seida & William F. Wempe, 
“Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Fol-
lowing Corporate Inversion,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 805 (2004) 
(finding tax savings from inverting, most of which could be 
attributed to earnings stripping); Bret Wells, “What Corpo-
rate Inversions Teach About International Tax Reform,” Tax 
Notes 1345, June 21, 2010 (three oil services companies 
that inverted in 2002 found their global ETRs fall by be-
tween 7 and 16 percent).
 30  Doron Narotzki, The True Economic Effects of Corporate 
Inversions, Tax Notes 1819, June 27, 2016 (finding large 
drops in global ETRs following inversions for firms regard-
less of size); Elizabeth Chorvat, “Expectations and Expa-
triations:  A Long-Run Event Study,: University of Chicago 
Public Law working paper no. 445 (Sept. 20, 2015) (finding 
that inverting firms produce excess returns that can be at-
tributed to intangibles held offshore, but cannot distinguish 
between tax savings or undervaluation of those assets 
NOTES 
6publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
pen to their firm’s global ETR after 
inverting. I looked at the inversion 
transactions announced since 2015 
to see what management said about 
expected future tax rates (see Table 1). 
Although not all inverting companies 
publicly stated that they expected a 
decline in their global ETRs, many 
did.31 
Viewed through the lens of cor-
porations’ global ETRs, the claim that 
inverting U.S.-domiciled companies do 
not improve their competitive posi-
tion by inverting is not supported by 
the data and is inconsistent with most 
studies. However, that approach buries 
all the hard questions about how U.S. 
companies and their foreign rivals are 
taxed by subsuming those questions 
under a single, widely available number 
— the global ETR. The main problem 
with that approach is that it is unclear 
why multinational companies, espe-
cially MNCs operating in countries 
with very different tax systems and tax 
rates, should make capital budgeting 
decisions in individual markets using 
global ETRs. Instead, it makes more 
sense for companies whose managers 
are focused exclusively on accounting 
earnings to make investment decisions 
using whatever accounting tax rates 
their managers expect their companies 
to incur on the earnings generated 
by those investments. Unfortunately, 
we simply do not know what MNCs’ 
ETRs are in specific markets, much 
less how they differ based on where the 
company is domiciled. Without any 
studies to rely on, any conclusion about 
whether inversions lower market-
specific ETRs in specified identified 
markets is shaky.32 
CASH FLOWS
I now examine the after-tax cash flow 
consequences of inverting, as finance 
theory emphasizes cash flows, not 
earnings. There is strong evidence that 
U.S. companies incur costs from hold-
ing their cash overseas to avoid repa-
triation taxes.33 The 2004-2005 tax 
holiday that reduced the maximum 
repatriation tax rate from 35 percent 
to 5.25 percent saw 843 U.S. MNCs 
repatriate in aggregate $362 billion 
(of which $312 billion was subject to 
the reduced holiday tax rate).34 Such 
large and widespread repatriations are 
inconsistent with the notion that it is 
costless for U.S. MNCs to maintain 
foreign cash balances that remain sub-
ject to taxation. If it were costless for 
companies to keep repatriated earn-
ings overseas, presumably they would 
have forgone repatriation during the 
holiday.35 At the same time, there is 
a lack of evidence that those costs are 
offset by the costs of non-U.S.-domi-
ciled MNC competitors complying 
with their home-country anti-abuse 
regimes, which are sometimes viewed 
as stricter and more costly to obey 
than the more porous U.S. anti-abuse 
rules.36
POLICY PATHS FORWARD
Critics of inversions need to appreci-
ate the differences between the U.S. 
tax system (worldwide with defer-
ral) and most other large country tax 
systems (territorial), as well as the 
arguments for inversions laid out 
in this Issue Brief. They also should 
acknowledge that the decline in inver-
sions in recent years is not because the 
tax benefits of foreign domicile have 
been eliminated, but rather because 
of changes in U.S. law that penalize 
U.S. MNCs for inverting and fear of 
becoming the subject of a tweet from 
President Trump that could send a 
company’s stock price plummeting. 
Policymakers who ignore this state of 
affairs are likely to adopt policies that 
produce adverse effects. 
Inversions indicate that something 
is fundamentally wrong with the U.S. 
tax system, and there are two obvious 
and feasible paths forward. The first 
path is more holistic. It would involve 
before the inversion); but see Rita Nevada Gunn & Thomas 
Z. Lys, “The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate Inversions on 
US Tax Revenue (working paper August 21, 2016) (arguing 
that inversions increase U.S. taxes because firms pay as 
much in tax, but shareholders pay more).
 31  In at least two inversions (IHS, which merged with the U.K.’s 
Markit, and Burger King, which merged with Canada’s Tim 
Hortons), management said it expected little change in ETR 
following the transaction.
 32  Robinson, Testimony, supra note 14.
 33  Harry Grubert & Roseanne Altshuler, “Fixing the System: 
An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of Inter-
national Tax,” 66 Nat’l Tax J. 671, 685 (2013) (estimating 
the marginal cost of deferral after 10 years at 7 percent).
 34  Melissa Redmiles, “One-Time Received Dividend Deduc-
tion,” 27 SOI Bull. 103 (2008). 
 35  The economic literature on the repatriation holiday focuses 
on how the repatriated funds were used. See, e.g., Jennifer 
L Blouin and Linda K. Krull, “Bringing It Home: A Study 
of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign 
Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,” 
47 J. Acct Res. 1027 (2009); Dhammika Dhamapala, C. 
Fritz Foley, and Kristin J. Forbes, “Watch What I Do, Not 
What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Home-
land Investment Act,” 66 J. Fin. 753 (2011); and Thomas 
J. Brennan,” What Happens After a Holiday?  Long-Term 
Effects of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA,” 5 Nw. JL 
& Soc. Pol’y 1 (2010).
 36  Robinson, Testimony, supra note 14 (noting that we lack the 
studies that would allow us to compare the costs of being 
subject to different anti-abuse regimes).
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tightening U.S. anti-abuse rules in 
order to stop earnings stripping as 
a preliminary step in the process of 
laying the foundation for a future 
territorial system. Once stricter 
rules are in place, the U.S. could 
then lower corporate tax rates and 
officially adopt a territorial system. 
The U.S. will never convince the rest 
of the world to go back to a system 
of worldwide taxation, which means 
competitiveness concerns will persist 
as long as the U.S. seeks to tax the 
active foreign income of U.S.-domi-
ciled MNCs. 
The second path is less robust, in 
that it does not address the competi-
tiveness motivations for inverting. 
The U.S. could lower the corporate 
tax rate for foreign earned income 
only and eliminate deferral. Such an 
approach would leave U.S. MNCs 
at a competitive disadvantage and 
hence would continue to encourage 
both inversions and foreign acquisi-
tions of U.S. corporations, but it 
would eliminate the incentive for 
U.S. firms to accumulate earnings 
overseas. If policymakers follow 
this route, the new rate they set will 
answer the question, intentionally 
or not, how the United States bal-
ances the revenue from taxing the 
overseas earnings of U.S. multina-
tionals against the value of leveling 
the playing field between U.S. and 
foreign corporations in overseas 
markets. In the end, policymakers 
will have to set that balance.
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